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In Egypt and Tunisia, where violent radicalization has increased in recent years, official 
religious institutions have been tasked by the governments with the mission of countering 
‘deviant’ ideas by preaching ‘moderate’ Islam. In order for religious institutions to play a 
positive role in preventing violent radicalization, they should start by consolidating their 
status as legitimate religious actors independent of political authorities, and then compete 
with their ideas in a plural religious sphere, rather than impose them on Muslims as ‘the true 
Islam’. While the EU could encourage the political regimes in both countries to ensure the 
independence of these religious institutions, it should engage cautiously with state religious 
institutions so as to not unintentionally damage their legitimacy in the religious sphere.
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Egypt and Tunisia, both of which are exemplary cases of strong state religious institutions and coun-
tries of first-tier importance to the EU, have over the past few years been witnessing a new wave of 
violent radicalization. Egyptian and Tunisian youths have been engaged in political violence, either 
with local groups or abroad, as in the case of the self-proclaimed Islamic State in Syria and Iraq (ISIS). 
This challenge has highlighted the role of state religious institutions in both countries in facing this 
current wave of violent radicalization, even though it is not only and not primarily in mosques that 
radicalization happens. Nevertheless, mosques can play an important role in refuting the religious 
foundations of these radical groups. In both countries, official religious institutions have been tasked 
with the mission of countering these radical groups’ ‘deviant’ ideas, such as excommunication and 
jihad, by preaching ‘moderate’ Islam, as it is defined by these political regimes themselves. Although, 
ideas can play an important role in any strategy to prevent violent radicalization, this ideational el-
ement by itself is not enough. Regardless of how moderate these ideas are, they need legitimate 
religious voices to transmit them. In order for religious institutions to play a positive role in preventing 
violent radicalization, they should start by consolidating their status as legitimate religious actors 
independent of political authorities and then compete with their ideas in a plural religious sphere, 
rather than impose them on Muslims as ‘the true Islam.’ While the EU could encourage the political 
regimes in both countries to ensure the independence of these religious institutions, it should engage 
cautiously with state religious institutions so as to not unintentionally harm their legitimacy in the 
religious sphere. 
VIOLENT RADICALIZATION IN EGYPT 
AND TUNISIA AFTER 2011
In Egypt, after the ousting of Mohamed Morsi in July 2013, terrorist attacks gradually spread from Si-
nai to the mainland. Although the country had witnessed various waves of Islamist insurgency in the 
past, the violent wave that followed the ousting of Morsi is considered “the deadliest and most com-
plex insurgency in its [Egypt’s] modern history” (Awad and Hashem 2015, 1). The number of terrorist 
attacks reached a peak in 2015 with around 700 attacks. It decreased to around 250 in 2017, and 
to only 54 in 2018. Three categories of violent Islamists became active: ones affiliated with Islamic 
State (IS); ones linked to Al-Qaeda; and ones emerging from the Muslim Brotherhood. While all these 
groups seek to topple the current regime, they adopt different ideological frames and apply different 
strategies to achieve this goal. The groups affiliated to both Islamic State and al-Qaeda rely on the 
principle of takfir – the process of excommunication as the basis for the military struggle against 
state institutions to establish Islamic governance based on sharia. Groups emerging from the Mus-
lim Brotherhood like Hassm and Liwa al-Thawra, however, reject the concept of excommunication 
and offer an alternative religious justification for the use of violence by underlining the religious con-
cept of dafa’ al-sa’el (repelling the assailant). According to this approach, state officials should be 
resisted not because of their faith but for their actions. 
The Salafi jihadist movement grew in Tunisia after the fall of Ben Ali in January 2011. This is 
evidenced by the number of deaths due to terrorism each year, which increased from 4 in 2011 
to 81 in 2015, according to the Global Terrorism Index. The number of terrorist attacks reached 























The most organized group on the Tunisian post-2011 Salafi jihadism scene was Ansar al-Sharia, 
which took control of a number of mosques in order to preach its ideas and recruit new mem-
bers. After the Tunisian government declared it a terrorist organization in 2013, 6,500 young 
Tunisians, members or sympathizers, were arrested. Others left for Libya or Syria and joined 
ISIS. Tunisia has been one of the top exporters of Salafi jihadist fighters, with more than 5,500 
Tunisians fighting with jihadist groups in Iraq, Libya, Mali, Syria and Yemen, as estimated by the 
UN in 2015 (OHCHR, 2015). The vacuum left by Ansar al-Sharia allowed other violent groups to 
expand. This is the case of the Al Qaeda-affiliated group the Uqba Bin Nafa’ brigade operating 
along the Algeria-Tunisia border and ISIS in Libya, which established a camp near the Tunisian 
border focusing on training Tunisian fighters. Among this group were the individuals responsible 
for attacks in 2015 on two prominent tourist destinations: the Bardo Museum in Tunis (where 22 
civilians were killed) and the beach resort of Sousse (where 38 civilians were killed). Tunisians 
who had joined ISIS in Libya also led the armed attack on the Tunisian border town of Ben Gar-
dane in March 2016.
The drivers of this wave of radicalization in the two countries are multiple, ranging from socio-eco-
nomic to political grievances. Although, the Salafi jihadist doctrine is only introduced in the second 
phase, where already radicalized youths are looking for a normative frame to follow, this ideological 
factor plays a decisive role in justifying the use of indiscriminate violence in these groups’ struggle 
against state institutions.
STATE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION 
RESPONSES TO VIOLENT EXTREMISM
Despite the different political paths that the two countries have followed since 2013, both Egypt and 
Tunisia have responded to the Salafi jihadist threat in almost the same way. Together with security 
measures, the two regimes have answered this wave of radicalization by tightening their grip on 
mosques and unlicensed imams. Both regimes have publicly urged their official imams to dissemi-
nate messages of moderation and tolerance to counter the discourse of violent groups and prevent 
youths from joining them. 
Between 2011 and 2013 the Egyptian state was effectively controlling and supervising fewer than 
half of Egypt’s mosques (Goma 2013). The new political regime, like its predecessors, conse-
quently sought to acquire an absolute monopoly over the religious sphere. It issued decision no. 
64 to bring all mosques in Egypt under its control and promulgated law no. 51, which prohibit-
ed people that did not have official authorisation from delivering sermons. Those authorized to 
preach included graduates of al-Azhar, the country’s primary religious institution, and preachers 
trained by institutes affiliated with the Ministry of Religious Endowments. In consequence 12,000 
preachers who had no religious education at al-Azhar were banned, although there was no proof 
that they had been disseminating extremist ideas. Likewise, the content of Friday sermons was 
standardized across Egypt, with the ministry setting the topic and main themes of sermons be-
fore prayers. Moreover, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi insisted that religious bodies 
should preach against radical Islamic philosophies. In January 2015, he leaned on Al-Azhar to 
undertake what he called a “religious revolution” to reform the institution’s Islamic thought and 
correct the concepts it teaches.
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Tunisia too has been following the same path. After the Ben Ali regime was toppled in 2011, the security 
apparatus lost control of the religious sphere. Estimates point to approximately half of the mosques in 
the country having had their imams expelled during this period (Donker 2019, 507). About 400 of Tuni-
sia’s 5685 mosques (2017 statistics) are believed to have come under Salafi control, and about 50 under 
that of Salafi jihadists (Petré, 2015). Secular parties called for tight state control of the religious sphere to 
ban any Islamist or Salafi groups from preaching in mosques. Before 2011, Ennahda used to criticize the 
state-controlled Islam. However, the religious chaos that accompanied the Tunisian uprising – together 
with political pressure from secular groups – led the Ennahda leadership to change its position. Since 
2013, successive ministers of religious endowments have been determined to extend the ministry’s 
control over all mosques and imams and close all illegal mosques. The ministry has relieved a number 
of unlicensed Salafi preachers from their duties and appointed other imams affiliated with the ministry 
in their place. The ministry suggests themes for Friday sermons and has employed 600 people tasked 
with ensuring that the imams’ rhetoric is in accordance with the law.
RECOMMENDATIONS
State religious institutions in both Egypt and Tunisia could play an important role in refuting the dis-
course of religious extremism that calls for violence, but the foremost problem of these institutions 
lies not in their religious discourse but in their religious legitimacy. Young people who are disaffected 
by the political and economic conditions in the countries and who wish to join jihadist organizations 
consider official religious institutions merely mouthpieces of the ruling regime. In order for official 
religious institutions to play an effective role in confronting the rhetoric of violence in the name of 
religion propagated by terrorist organizations, they must first start by consolidating their religious 
legitimacy, and only then adapt their religious discourse. Strengthening their religious legitimacy re-
quires two main measures: for the official religious establishment to maintain its independence from 
the political system; and for the political system to not monopolize the religious sphere. 
STATE RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS SHOULD IDENTIFY WITH THE STATE, NOT WITH 
THE GOVERNMENT
Official religious institutions are part of the state’s institutions, but they should maintain a distance 
from all political forces, including the ruling regime, in order to ensure their independence and regain 
their legitimacy within the religious sphere. It might be difficult to imagine a complete separation 
between the religious and the political but a lack of clear boundaries undermines them both. The 
involvement of political figures in the religious sphere renders their religious discourse and activities 
less credible, while the interference of religious figures in political activities makes political actions 
appear manipulated. There is no easy policy solution to get there other than religious leaders – of 
Al-Azhar, Zaytouna and other prominent mosques – explaining publicly how legitimacy through inde-
pendence can make them relevant actors in social affairs, including de-radicalization. State religious 
institutions vary in their dependence on the government. Ministries of endowments are part of the 
government while scholarly institutions (universities and councils of senior scholars) enjoy slightly 
more independence. If a government calls on the latter to reform their discourse then they should 
use it as an opportunity for a new contract with the rulers: independence in exchange for reform, 
because any effective reform is conditional on these institutions’ independence. Religious leaders – 























government and test its intentions. The European role in this process can only be limited. However, 
the channel between Pope Francis and the Grand Imam of al-Azhar, Sheikh Ahmed al-Tayyeb, is use-
ful in this regard because it increases Al-Azhar’s independence through international exposure. His 
dialogue with the Vatican allows al-Azhar to claim to represent all Muslims. Hence, instead of being 
merely a state employee, the relation with the Vatican allows the Grand Imam of al-Azhar to claim 
an international status.
RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS SHOULD MANAGE THE RELIGIOUS SPHERE, NOT 
MONOPOLIZE IT 
The official religious ‘moderate’ discourse should not be imposed on society as the ‘correct image 
of Islam’ because there is none. Such rhetoric only alienates parts of society toward non-moderate 
ideas. Great religions are not controllable, and a large popular Islam is always present and alive 
(Sasnal, 2016). Instead, each party must represent its religious ideas in a religious environment char-
acterized by pluralism and freedom. 
Both states, represented by the Ministry of Religious Endowments in Egypt and the Ministry of 
Religious Affairs in Tunisia, should change their current policies and aim to not monopolize their 
religious spheres and introduce new rules that seek to manage them in accordance with neutral 
rules that apply to all parties operating without exception as long as they adhere to non-violent 
discourse. The OIC charter and the UN, of which Muslim countries are members, espouse the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, including arts. 18 and 19, which stipulate a free religious 
sphere. Within this plural religious sphere, official imams should be trained to compete for the 
hearts and minds of believers, and not just dictate their vision of Islam to them. In an environment 
monopolized by official institutions, parallel religious spheres can create breeding grounds for 
jihadist groups to preach their ideas and recruit new members. In pluralist environments, where 
many voices are heard, the extreme lose ground. 
THE MAXIMUM THE EU CAN DO IS TO CAUTIOUSLY ENGAGE WITH RELIGIOUS 
INSTITUTIONS IN THE MENA 
There is a political penchant in the EU and its Member States to help social actors in neighbouring 
countries who have a direct and real impact on their societies, thus expanding the civil society sector. 
Some European leaders also welcome the calls for the reform of religious discourse issued by sever-
al MENA governments and rush to support them without realizing the problematic (and instrumental 
in radicalization) dependence that exists between state religious institutions and governments. In 
2019 the EU launched its Global Exchange on Religion in Society (EEAS, 2019), while its Member 
States have established offices with special representatives on freedom of religion and belief. This 
increased diplomatic interest in religion should not translate into direct attempts at financially aiding 
or influencing religious actors in the MENA, be they state or non-state actors, regardless of inten-
tions, so as not to further diminish their legitimacy. ‘Foreign interference’ is commonly used by MENA 
regimes to discredit local civil society. However, increased contact by European religious civil society 
actors – associations, local churches, congregations – with their state and non-state religious coun-
terparts in the MENA is highly beneficial in diminishing the xenophobic aspect of hardline religious 
dogma. The EU project – Global Exchange on Religion in Society – could be used as a facilitator of 
such communication and contact. 
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